

Dr. Love Enters the Flint Water Crisis. Given the above history, Edwards literally cringed, [when he read what appeared to be the first personal communication received from Dr. Love in the 8 years since she left VT. Expressing concerns about his health, which had indeed been compromised during the D.C. crisis in part due to backstabbing from professional colleagues like herself, she eventually got around to the real reason for the email—funding.](#) Like hundreds of faculty who grew interested in the Flint story AFTER the Federal emergency declaration January 2016, she heard about it on Rachel Maddow and at an overseas conference. While acknowledging her general lack of relevant expertise, she pitched a research idea on point of use (POU) lead water filters as part of a UM team coordinated by Dr. Lut Raskin.

Dr. Raskin is also a faculty member at UM, as well as a renowned scientist of admirable expertise and character. Raskin is one of the nation's foremost experts on [how microbial community structure changes during potable water filtration and distribution](#), a topic on which [Dr Pruden and Edwards' team were also working on.](#) Drs. Raskin, Pruden and Edwards were also part of a larger pioneering scientific community built by the [Sloan Foundation Microbiology of the Built Environment](#)(MOBE) program, 2011-2017, which engaged experts on research involving appropriate use of molecular tools (e.g., targeting DNA through tools such as qPCR and next-generation sequencing) to identify and build fundamental understanding of microorganisms in buildings and homes. This community learned hard lessons which we will term "Sloan MOBE 101" that can be partly summarized as follows: 1) "Don't ever claim that finding DNA of a pathogen in an environmental sample is a health risk—it could just be a dead bacteria," 2) "Without proper experimental controls you can scare yourself and others needlessly," and 3) "Gee, it is very easy to contaminate a sample."

Ever the naïve idealist, Edwards rose above personal pettiness and immediately made the first introduction of Dr. Love to Dr. McElmurry. Four days later when [Dr. Raskin and Dr. Teri Olson \(also at UM\) made a video independent of Dr. Love](#) highlighting some important basic scientific questions about POU water filters, he

figured this would be a great way to engage Raskin, Olson, and Love's expertise in the FWC response. [He recommended that the National Science Foundation \(NSF\) support three research proposals aimed at studying POU filters in Flint–McElmurry thanked Edwards February 10th in writing when the projects were funded.](#)

By the time FACHEP Phase 2 was taking shape in July 2016, [Dr. Love](#) had somehow become Dr. McElmurry's mentor, chief enabler, and mutual pontificator on the engineering code of ethics to MDHHS and others (Figure 1). McElmurry grew to count on Love's supposed expertise in potable water disease and *Legionella*, once informing Dr. Pruden "<When it comes to *Legionella*> I just do whatever Nancy tells me." For her part, Dr. Love bet every ounce of a reputation gained over a respectable career studying sewage treatment, backing McElmurry's newly concocted prowess in "[urban infrastructure and human health.](#)" Neither McElmurry nor Love ever showed the slightest reservation about allowing people to believe they were drinking water experts. Even worse, those with true expertise were mysteriously excluded.

[We previously described how Dr. Rose was cut out of FACHEP.](#) When Edwards supported the POU water filter research, it was predicated on Love's written assertion she was on a UM team coordinated by Dr. Raskin. Somehow, somehow, by about June 2016, Love and McElmurry had jockeyed themselves into leadership positions where they not only had the NSF water filter funding, but also largely controlled the millions in FACHEP research funding bearing the seal of approval from Governor Snyder himself. For those conducting research and understanding such matters, is inconceivable that McElmurry and Love would be leaders of FACHEP's *Legionella* investigation, while world class talents like Dr. Rose and Raskin were brushed aside. What makes this outcome even more nauseating is that both Dr. Rose and Raskin were volunteering their efforts on the FWC in 2014 and 2015, well before the research funding which attracted McElmurry and Love was available.

One can easily imagine how this likely came to be: Drs. Love and McElmurry, excluding Drs. Rose and Raskin to keep all the power and glory they dreamed of all to themselves, avoiding irksome challenges

to their ideas and authority. This, without any regard whatsoever to what that would mean for Flint residents and Michigan taxpayers, who would soon be paying a price for their lack of expertise. For a short period, they initially leaned heavily on Dr. Masten's drinking water treatment expertise, but Masten said she began to "question their ethics and professional judgment, along with their ability to meet the goals and objectives of the various projects, starting October 2016." The trio soon became a duo—McElmurry and Love became the dominant public scientific voices of FACHEP. They would henceforth own responsibility, not just for the success and glory, but also for any blunders and harm.

<http://flintwaterstudy.org/2019/01/part-4/>